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UNIFORM FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE*
BY LESTER B. ORFIELD**
In 1961 the Judicial Conference of the United States resolved that the
objective of developing federal rules of evidence is meritorious.' This
resolution is amply supported by the facts and by the opinions of most writers.
In the first place the law of evidence in the federal courts, as in the
states, has been and still is in very poor condition. In 1898 Professor Thayer
of the Harvard Law School pointed out that the "chief defects" in our law
of evidence are the
motley and undiscriminated character of its contents . . .the ambiguity of its terminology; the multiplicity and rigor of its rules and
exceptions to rules; the difficulty of grasping these and perceiving
their true place and relation in the system, and of determining, in
the decision of new questions, whether to give scope and extension
to the rational principles that lie at the bottom of all modern theories
of evidence, or to those checks and qualifications of these principles
which have grown out of the machinery through which our system
2
is applied, namely, the jury.
Professor Thayer thought that a system of evidence should be "easily
'8
grasped," "easily applied," and aimed "straight at the substance of justice."
He also formulated the two leading principles to be applied to such a system:
"(1) . . . nothing is to be received which is not logically probative of
some matter required to be proved; and (2) . . . everything which is
thus probative should come in unless a clear ground of policy or law excludes
''4
it.
He also pointed out that it is the "rejection on one or another practical
ground, of what is really probative, which is the characteristic thing" in
5
our law of evidence.
Professor Cleary has characterized the law of evidence as "sagging to
the point of collapse under its own weight."' 6 He describes the two basic
* This Article is based on an address delivered by Professor Orfield at the
Judicial Conference of the Seventh Circuit on May 14, 1963.
** Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law; A.B., 1924, University
of Minnesota; LL.B., 1927, University of Minnesota; M.A., 1928, Duke University;
S.J.D., 1929, University of Michigan; member, United States Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure; consultant, American Law Institute
Model Code of Evidence; author, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL and
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problems as the multiplicity of evidence rules and their unreality and suggests
that "the unreality is what causes the multiplicity."

7

Professor McCormick

stated in a law review article that rules of evidence should be uncomplicated
so that they can be easily applied at any given moment by both judges and
8
lawyers, but he lamented that such is not the case today. In 1921 Mr.
Justice Cardozo complained that portions of the law of evidence "are so
unwieldy that many of the simplest things of life, transactions so common as
the sale and delivery of merchandise, are often the most difficult to prove."
In 1936 Professor Wigmore stated that "the law of Evidence in our
Federal Courts is in a most deplorable condition. It is inferior to that of
any of the fifty States and Territories-I say, inferior to any of them, and
not only inferior but far inferior."'1 He then added: "I for one have long
ago given up hope of being able to state what is the Federal law on any
rule of evidence."'" Professors Morgan and Maguire have likened the hearsay
rule to "an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of
1 2
Other writers have more
paintings by cubists, futurists and surrealists."'
recently described the law of evidence in the federal courts as being "in a
u5
u4
deplorable state,"' 8 "in dreadful condition,' and "grotesque.'
The reason why federal evidence law seems to operate satisfactorily in
practice despite its complexities "is not that the complexity is mastered but
that it has been ignored."'1 6 Another reason, suggested by Professor Thayer,
is that many judges let the parties try their own cases and let them apply
17
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that as a
said
who
Hand
N.
Augustus
of
approach
the
recalled
E. Clark
useful or
all
at
was
which
trial judge he would always admit all evidence
8
admissible, and in so doing he was never reversed on appeal.' Is it not
7. Ibid.
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TEXAS L. REV. 661, 662 (1942).
9. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 121-22 (1921).
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13. Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D.
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14. Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275-76
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16. Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275, 276
(1962).
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18. Clark, Foreword to The Uniform Rules of Evidence, 10 RUTGERs L. REV.
479, 480 (1956). For a similar view expressed by Judge Learned Hand see 19 ALI
PROCEEDINGS 225 (1942).
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time that strenuous efforts be made to conform the law in books to the law in
action?19 Must our policy always be that of muddling through?
RULE MAKING BY WHOM?

In 1943 the Supreme Court stated broadly that. "Congress has power to
prescribe what evidence is to be received in the courts of the United States. '20
When the federal courts apply state law in civil actions they do so because
Congress by statute so directed. Where there are federal statutes providing
rules of evidence they are applied even in diversity cases. Dean Joiner has
concluded that the Supreme Court has inherent power to lay down rules of
evidence.2 1 It is preferable, however, to rest the power on the rule-making
statutes inasmuch as the Court has never laid down rules in the absence of
such statutes.2 2 The various rule-making statutes use the word "procedure"
which is broad enough to include evidence.23 That is the view of most
courts and writers.
Judge Alexander Holtzoff has stated:
The law of evidence is in the field of adjective law and relates to
procedure rather than substance. For this reason, a rounded system
of rule-making should include evidence as well as pleading and
practice. The Advisory Committee of the Supreme Court of the
United States on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took this
view, as it drafted a number of rules relating to evidence, which
were adopted and promulgated by the Supreme Court. The same
course was followed by the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules
24
of Criminal Procedure.
19. Professor Schlesinger has indicated that the continental lawyers have made
some progress in freeing their courts from the "fetters of artificial restrictions on the

admission of relevant evidence."

SCHLESINGER,

COMPARATIVE LAW

251 (2d ed. 1959).

"Except for matters of privilege and of personal incompetence to testify on account
of age or kinship, the civilian codes contain no exclusionary rule of evidence, and particularly no hearsay or opinion rule." Id. at 26.
20. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943). Congress may change the rules
of evidence in criminal cases "whenever they think proper, within the limits prescribed
by the Constitution." United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851).
21. Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429,
435 (1957).
22. See Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D.
341, 342 (1960); Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV.
275, 277 (1962).
23. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1883).
The word procedure itself, long stopped at the threshold of our legal vocabulary,
before making its definite entrance. A transplant of the French procidure,
it was good English at least as early as the seventeenth century, but not until
the nineteenth did it enter into general use by the profession, which before
had been content with the trichotomy, "pleading, practice and evidence."
Millar, The Lineage of Some Procedural Words, 25 A.B.A.J. 1023 (1939). See ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 1 n.2 (1947).
24. Holtzoff, Institute on Practical Evidence, 18 F.R.D. 367, 378 (1956).
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Professor Wigmore has also concluded that there is a region "where the
rules of Evidence fade into the rules of procedure (for example, the procedure of taking depositions) .... *25 In speaking of the topics of burden
of proof, presumptions, to whom evidence must be presented, judicial notice,
and judicial admissions, he stated that they "represent the border line of what
is in strictness the law of Evidence. '26 The same is true as to procedure in
preparation for trial such as taking depositions, as to the deliberations of
the jury, and as to appeal because improper evidence has been considered.
The only reasonable conclusion is that one cannot lay down rules of pleading
and practice without to a considerable extent also laying down rules of evidence.
Perhaps there are those who would maintain that evidence law may be
adequately developed by precedents handed down in the decisions of particular cases. But Professor Thayer was of the opinion that courts should
not endeavor to improve the law of evidence by judicial precedents without
having a full understanding of the history, nature, and scope of the present
rules and without clearly seeing where they mean to come out.2 7 Chief Justice
Stone was of the view that a legal system created ad hoc lacks both form and
symmetry, and the method itself lacks the scientific and philosophical gener2
alizations that would establish the basis for an enduring system. 8 He
also maintained that "a statutory enactment of the rules of evidence abolishing
many of the existing rules altogether" is a proposal "worthy of serious consideration.

29

Another item for consideration is whether reliance should be placed
either on individual statutes or on a statutory code enacted by Congress
rather than court rules. There are statutes on handwriting,80 business
records, 3 ' and official records.3 2 A statute of 1878 permitted a criminal
defendant to testify.3 3 There is the Jencks Act regarding statements and
reports of government witnesses. 3 4 These statutes, however, cover only a very
small part of the law of evidence, and Congress has neither the time nor the
training to develop a comprehensive code. Thus, some writers have rather
convincingly concluded that in matters of practice and procedure court
25. 1 WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE

at xviii (3d ed. 1940).

26. Id. at 9. As to judicial notice, see THAYER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 279 and as
to burden of proof, id. at 353.
27. Id. at 534.
28. Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification, 23 COLUM. L. REv.
319, 321 (1923).
29. Id. at 329.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1731 (1958).
31. Federal Business Records Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1733 (1958).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 3481 (1958).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).
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rules have distinct advantages over statutory law: the former tend to be
generally less complicated, can be changed more easily, can be tested and
shaped by those persons more familiar with the requirements of litigation,
and can be viewed in the proper perspective of being subsidiary to the substantive law.A5
The demand for rules of court in this area is not merely a recent one.
In 1898 Professor Thayer called not only for simplification of the rules of
evidence but also for continuous control and shaping by the highest courts.86
In 1938 the American Bar Association Committee on the Improvement of
the Law of Evidence also reported that consideration should be given to
proposals for improvement of rules of evidence by court rules in view of
the then recent legislative developments making it clear that civil practice
can best be governed in that manner rather than by legislation. 7
PRESENT LAW OF EVIDENCE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Rule 43(a)38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides three
sources for federal civil evidence: federal statutes, federal decisional law, and
state law. Unhappily, though, all three of these need improvement. Rule 43(a)
reveals that there is no separate body of federal civil evidence law, not to
mention an up-to-date body of law. In contrast there is a separate body
of law as to federal civil pleading and federal civil practice; furthermore, it
is up to date and progressive.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are lacking with regard to evidence
in several respects. They do not modernize evidence as they do pleading
and practice. They do not replace common law and statutes by rules of
court but merely state unmodernized sources of evidence. They do not
35. See Vanderbilt, Improving the Administration of Justice-Two Decades of
Development, 26 U. CINc. L. REV. 145, 250 (1957); Green, To What Extent Courts
Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence, 26 A.B.A.J. 482, 486

(1940).
36. THAYER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 530. Professor Thayer, however, opposes
codification. Id. at 511.
37. 63 A.B.A. REP. 570, 571 (1938). See 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8(b) (3d ed.
1940). "The final yield will be the acceptance by national and state courts of the task
of embodying in rules of court a rational, simplified code of Evidence." McCormick,
Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507, 581 (1938).
38. Form and Admissibility. In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be
taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these rules. All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the United
States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the
United States on the hearing of the suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the
United States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the
reception of the evidence governs and the evidence shall be presented according
to the most convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to
which reference is herein made. The competency of a witness to testify shall
be determined in like manner.
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replace conformity to state law with uniformity throughout the nation. They
do not furnish a model for state courts. Rules of evidence in civil cases in
the federal courts are not uniform throughout the federal courts because of
the need for application of state rules of evidence under Rule 43(a). This
is true in federal question cases as well as in diversity cases. Thus it would
be impossible to write a single book on federal civil evidence, but one would
have to be written for each of the fifty states. In this respect the law of
federal civil evidence is inferior to that of federal criminal evidence. As to
the latter, state law has no application. Rules of evidence in civil cases also
do not conform to state practice because a federal statute or a federal rule
may control the admissibility of evidence. We have two systems of proving
the truth in the courts of every state.
Our system of trial by jury has been mentioned as preventing the
modernization of our rules of evidence. Historically our systems of pleading
and practice were devised as they were because of trial by jury ;S9 yet, that
did not prevent their modernization. No more should it prevent the modernization of evidence.
Does Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins 40 stand in the way of federal rules of

evidence? There are several answers. First, the problem of the Erie doctrine
is already with us even without court rules of evidence. A second answer is
that the same problem already arises as to rules of pleading and practice in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In a minor way the Erie case has made
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not uniformly applicable. It has been
concluded that six of the rules may be invalidated by the Erie case: rule 3 on
complaint, rule 15(c) on amendment of complaint, rule 13(a) on compulsory
counterclaims, rule 17(b) on capacity to sue, rule 23(b) on derivative suits
41
by a shareholder, and possibly rule 8(c) on pleading affirmative defenses.
However, no one has seriously contended that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or even the six rules just mentioned should be repealed. Indeed
a writer has concluded that the Erie problem in federal evidence cases "has
been minimal" in comparison with its impact elsewhere. 42 A third answer is
that even though the Erie doctrine applies in federal civil actions and causes
trouble there as to uniform rules of evidence, it does not apply in criminal
cases or in admiralty cases.
The federal courts have now had thirty years in which they could have
39. THAYER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 3; Holdsworth, The Development of Oral
and Written Pleading, 2 SELECTED ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 614,
619-20, 623-26 (1908).
40. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
41. See Note, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 62 HARV. L. REV.
1030 (1949) ; Comment, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1067 n.106 (1962) (citing cases sustaining Erie attacks on Rules 8(e) (2), 8(a), 13(g) and 4(d) (1).
42. Id. at 1069.
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modernized the law of criminal evidence. The Preliminary Study for the
Judicial Conference of the United States concludes: "The reluctance of the
Supreme Court to improve evidence rules by decision, is matched by the
inability of the lower courts to show progress toward a modern law of
Federal criminal evidence." 43 I have read the decisions for that period, and
I fully agree. The few liberal decisions are voices crying in the wilderness.
It may also be argued that a complete set of rules of evidence set
forth in rules of court is too ambitious and without precedent. This is not
so. Sir James Stephen states:
Indeed, the whole scheme, and the fundamental propositions of my
Digest of the Law of Evidence, are only a scheme of the law as it
stands, devised by myself for the purposes of an Indian Evidence
Act (Act 1 of 1872), which, with little if any alteration, has, since
1872, been the Act by which the law of evidence is regulated through44
out the whole of the Indian Empire.
It applies to this day in India, Pakistan, and Burma.45 It has been adopted
in Ceylon and by the African countries of Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda.
Several draft codes of evidence have also been presented in Israel. 46 In 1939
47
Lord Wright thought the English law of evidence ready for codification.
In 1953 the Evershed Committee proposed the codification of the statutory
law of evidence from 1609 to 1938.48 England does not now have rules of
evidence laid down by the courts; however, that proves very little. In England
trial by jury is used very seldom, and appeals on evidence points are rare.
Lawyers who appear in court are highly trained barristers, and judges are
usually former barristers who have practiced at the bar twenty-five years
or more. English judges have discretion on many phases of evidence. In
spite of this system English legal scholars are critical of the existing English
law of evidence.

49

A Canadian scholar has praised the Uniform Rules of Evidence and
urged that a similar code be prepared in Canada.50 Complete drafts of rules
of evidence based on the Uniform Rules have been prepared in New Jersey
43. Preliminary Report, in

COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF

RULES OF EVIDENCE (1962), found
in 30 F.R.D. 73, 99 (1962) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY STUDY),
44. STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 194 (2d ed. 1890).
45. Nokes, Codification of the Law of Evidence in Common Law Jurisdictions, 5
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,

INTERNATIONAL

& COMPARATIVE

L.Q. 347, 350 (1956).

46. Id. at 352.
47. WRIGHT, LEGAL ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 338, 339 (1939).
48. Nokes, supra note 45, at 349.
49. See, e.g., Nokes, The English Jury and the Law of Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REV.
153 (1956).
50. Murray, Evidence: A Fresh Approach, The American Uniform Rules of

Evidence (1953), 37

CAN. B.REV.

576 (1959).
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and Puerto Rico. 51 In the Virgin Islands the legislature in 1957 adopted the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, and they seem to be working well. 52 The Canal

Zone has adopted rules of evidence.
It may be argued that after the adoption of rules of evidence there will
be a period of uncertainty while the rules are first being applied and construed. 53 The obvious answer to this contention is that the same was true
as to the rules of pleading and practice.
Topics

COVERED

Certainly the hearsay rule should be included as one of the topics
covered by rules of court. This area gives the courts a great deal with which
to start. Possibly as much as one third of the law of evidence is concerned
with the complications arising from the admission of hearsay. 54 The opinion
rule should be incorporated as it deals with form.5 5 Examination and impeachment of witnesses should be covered. 56 The rules as to relevance5 7 and the
rules as to writings should be covered. 5 8 Competency of witnesses should be
included. 59 The procedure of admitting and excluding evidence should also
be included6 ° because rules 43(c) and 46 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure only partially
deal with the subject.6 ' Demonstrative evidence should be covered. Judicial
notice should be covered.
Some topics should not be incorporated into the rules of court. Parol
evidence should not be included because it involves substantive law. 62 Dean
Joiner concluded in 1957: "Only privileges, burden of proof, and conclusive
presumptions may involve more or should be classified as substance and ...
may be beyond the rule-making power. ' 63 Thus, burden of proof and
51.

Clark, supra note 18.

52.

PRELIMINARY STUDY,

30 F.R.D. 112.

53. 20 PA. B.A.Q. 220, 221 (1949) ; Note, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 719, 732 (1950).
54.

Nokes, The English Jury and the Law of Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REV. 153, 167

(1956). In

MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE

(1954), 180 pages of a total of 712 are devoted to

hearsay.
55. Green, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 482, 489 (1940).
56. Ibid.
57. Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275, 301

(1962).
58.

Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D.

341, 345 (1960).
59. Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10
467, 483 (1957).
60.

VAND.

L. REV.

Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275, 293

(1962).
61. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 113 n.4, 121 n.51 (1954).
62. PRELIMINARY STUDY, 30 F.R.D. 107; Note, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1069,
1073 (1962) ; THAYER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 390, 513.
63. Joiner, supra note 21, at 435.
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presumptions should not be included even in federal question cases. 6 4 Non-

conclusive presumptions are substantive for Erie purposes even though they
may be within the rule-making power.6 5
The existence of too many privileges prevents getting all the facts before
the court. A number of writers on evidence would exclude privileged communications from rules of court ;66 however, equally distinguished experts
would include them.67 One who would exclude this area concedes that "the
law of privilege is at least half-procedure, for a truth-seeking interest is
being weighed against a truth-obstructing interest to establish the lines we
seek." 6 Certainly, in federal criminal cases federal standards are applied.6 9
Likewise, in federal question cases federal standards perhaps should be
71
applied, 70 but in diversity cases no rules should be laid down.
CONCLUSION

The Uniform Rules of Evidence have the sponsorship of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the American Bar Association, and the
American Law Institute. Those rules are "simple, uniform, accessible and
reasonably progressive. '72 The Model Code failed to win acceptance "chiefly
because its form of expression was thought to be too academic and unfamiliar,
because its widening of the admission of hearsay was believed to go too far,
and because in one general rule it recognized a latitude of discretion in the
3
trial judge to exclude which its critics regarded as excessive." '7 The Uniform
Rules corrected the first two objections though they retained the third. Professor Morgan has stated that he believes a set of rules incorporating the best
64. Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275, 283
(1962). But regulating management of presumptions in the course of trial is probably
within the rule-making power for federal question cases.
65. Id. at 299.
66. Louisell & Crippin, Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN. L. REV. 413, 414 (1956).
67. Morgan, supra note 59, at 483-84; Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control
Over Judicial Rule-Making, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 42 (1958).
68. Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D.
341, 347 (1960).
69. Hawkins v.United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
70. See Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139, 144 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 849 (1945).
71. Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275, 299,
302 (1962).
72. McCormick, Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TEXAS
L. REV. 557, 573 (1955). The Uniform Rules of Evidence are brief. They are printed
with commentary in a pamphlet of 57 pages, and printed alone without commentary
they amount to 25 pages in a casebook. See MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 844-69 (4th ed. 1957). There are only 72 rules with 9

subdivisions:

I. General provisions; II. Judicial notice;

III.

Presumptions;

IV.

Witnesses; V. Privileges; VI. Extrinsic policies affecting admissibility; VII. Expert and other opinion testimony; VIII. Hearsay evidence; and IX. Authentication
and contents of writings.

73. McCormack, supra note 72, at 573.
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features of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Model Code, drafted,
for example, by the Advisory Committee of the United States Supreme
Court, could not only improve both works but also would have a good chance
74
of acceptance.
After twenty-one years no state has adopted the American Law Institute
Model Code of Evidence. After ten years no state except Kansas has adopted
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. The Advisory Committee of the Supreme
Court on Rules of Civil Procedure commenced its task of improving the
law of pleading and practice twenty-eight years ago. The Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure began its work twenty-two years
ago. Is it not time to begin laying down rules of evidence so that the whole
field of judicial procedure will be covered? The rules of procedure thus far
developed have enjoyed the utmost admiration and support of the law schools.
Our casebooks on pleading and practice are full of cases applying the federal
rules. In 1957 the Judicial Conferences of the Third and Sixth Circuits
recommended federal rules of evidence. 75 The American Bar Association by
its House of Delegates in 1958 recommended that the Supreme Court lay
down uniform rules of evidence. 76 In my judgment the greatest hope-possibly the only hope-for the improvement of the law of evidence both in the
federal and state courts lies in promulgation by the Supreme Court of rules
of evidence. Mr. Justice Cardozo once said:
The time is ripe for betterment. "Le droit a ses 6poques," says
Pascal in words which Professor Hazeltine has recently recalled to
us. The law has its "epochs of ebb and flow." One of the flood
seasons is upon us. Men are insisting, as perhaps never before,
that law shall be made true to its ideal of justice.
Let us gather up
77
the driftwood, and leave the waters pure.
Ecclesiastes tells us that there is a time for every purpose-"a time to break
down, and a time to build up."' 78 This is a time to build up.
74.
(1956).
75.
76.
77.
78.

Morgan, The Uniform Rules and the Model Code, 31 TUL. L. REv. 145, 152
1957 JUDICIAL CONF. SEPT. REP. 43.
44 A.B.A.J. 1113 (1958).
Cardozo, supra note 9,at 126.
Ecclesiastes 3: 3.

